Article 109 - Family Code and Case: Santos Vs. Bartolome, G.R. No. L-18032

Article 109

          The following shall be the exclusive property of each spouse:

          (1) That which is brought to the marriage as his or her own;

          (2) That which each acquires during the marriage by gratuitous title;

          (3) That which is acquired by right of redemption, by barter or by           exchange with property belonging to only one of the spouse; and

          (4) That which is purchased with exclusive money of the wife or of the     husband.

Property exclusively owned.

          There may be properties acquired or owned by the spouses before the marriage. Such properties are considered exclusive properties of the husband and wife, unless they are brought into the marriage as parts of the absolute community property.

Sale with right to repurchase.

          If a future spouse sold his property with right to repurchase before the marriage and reacquired it during the marriage, such property is still the exclusive property of said spouse (Santos v. Bartolome, 44 Phil. 76). If the money he paid for the repurchase came from the conjugal assets, then, said spouse must reimburse the conjugal partnership. If, however, the money used was the exclusive money of the spouse and he can prove it, then, that remains to be exclusive property and there is no obligation on his part to reimburse the conjugal partnership (Lorenzo v. Nicolas, 91 Phil. 686). Note, however, that the reimbursement shall be done at the liquidation of the conjugal partnership (Santos v. Bartolome, 44 Phil. 76; Consunji v. Tison, 15 Phil. 81).

Nature of inherited property.

          If one of the spouse is a recipient of a property through testate or intestate succession or even by donation, the property is an exclusive property of such spouse.

Award of damages.

          If a spouse meets an accident and in a suit for damages, he is awarded damages for hospitalization expenses, medical assistance and loss of salary, the Supreme Court said that these are conjugal properties (Liluis v. MRR, 62 Phil. 56). But any moral damages awarded for personal injury in such accident are exclusive properties of each spouse.

Nature of gratuity from the government.

          Monetary benefits given gratis by the government because ofprevious work is a gratuity and should be considered separate property.

          Hence, the directive in a default judgment to deliver 1/2 of the husband’s retirement benefits to the wife who sued him for support, makes the default judgment doubly illegal because: (1) retirement gratuity is exempt from execution; (2) being a reward for lengthyand faithful service to the recipient, it should be treated as separate property of the retiree. (Sarmiento vs. Judge Ordoñez and IAC, G.R. No. 75409, August 17, 1987).

Redemption of property.

          If the husband redeems the paraphernal property of the wife with his money, he does not own the same. Ownership belongs to the heirs of the wife and the wife. (Alvarez vs. Espiritu, G.R. No. L-18833, August 14, 1965). But the estate owes the husband.

Property acquired by exchange.

          An exchange presupposes that there is a barter. But if an exclusive property is exchanged with another and sometimes was used by the owner, the same is conjugal

property without prejudice to the trade-in value. The conjugal partnership is indebted to the original owner. (Abella de Diaz vs. Erlanger and Galinger, Inc., 59 Phil. 326).

Purchase of property.

          If a property is purchased partly with money of the wife and partly with conjugal money, the same is partly conjugal and partly paraphernal. (Padilla vs. Paterno, G.R. No. L-4130, September 30, 1953).

When property is acquired under Homestead Law.

          Under the Homestead Law (C.A. No. 141, Sec. 105), a vested right over a homestead is acquired only by the presentation of the final proof and its approval by the Director of Lands. If a spouse applies for a homestead and dies before it is granted, the same belongs to the heirs. It would never be a conjugal property. (Ude Soliman vs. Icdang, et al., G.R. No. L-15924, May 31, 1961; Veran vs. CA, G.R. No. 41154, January 29, 1988).

Wife is the owner and administrator of her separate properties. Sale by husband; effect.

          The wife is the owner and administrator of her paraphernal properties. If she delivers the administration to her husband, it must be in a public instrument and such instrument must be recorded in the Registry of Property. If the properties are movables, the husband must give adequate security. But even if he is the administrator of the paraphernal properties, he cannot dispose of the paraphernal properties. (Manotok Realty, Inc. vs. CA, G.R. No. L-45038, April 30, 1987. Please refer to Art. 145, Family Code). The reason for the rule is that selling is an act of ownership. Administration does not include such power to sell.

An exchange presupposes that there is a barter.

          If an exclusive property is exchanged with another and some funds were used by the owner, the same is conjugal property without prejudice to the trade-in value. The conjugal partnership is indebted to the original owner. (Abella de Diaz vs. Erlanger and Galiner, Inc., 59 Phil. 328).

          If a property is purchased partly with money of the wife and partly on conjugal money, the same is partly conjugal and partly paraphernal. (De Padilla vs. Paterno, G.R. No. L-4130, September 30, 1953).

If during the marriage, property was acquired by the spouses but the same was registered in the name of one of the spouses only, the law presumes that the property is conjugal, unless the contrary is proved.

          The adjudication of real property to one of the spouses does not necessarily mean that it is his or her exclusive property, if said land was acquired during the marriage. But if the title, for instance, says that the land is registered in the name of“Teodulo Diaz married to Maria Espejo,” this shows that the property was acquired during the existence of the conjugal partnership. (Diaz vs. CA, G.R. No. L-42130, November 10, 1986).

Owner of property acquired with the exclusive money of either spouse.

          As a rule, properties purchased with the use of the exclusive money of either spouse is separate property. (Hartske vs. Frankel and Phil. Trust Co., 54 Phil. 156; Gefes vs. Salvio, 36 Phil. 221; Gonzales vs. Miller, 69 Phil. 340). Hence, if the property acquired during the marriage with money belonging exclusively to the wife is considered as her own, it is unquestionable that it does not belong to the class of community property. Therefore, the husband is not authorized to alienate, encumber, or make contracts in regard thereto, without the knowledge and consent of its lawful owner, and a sale or conveyance thereof by the husband, who is not its owner, is null and void.

          In fact, in Perez vs. Tuason de Perez, 109 Phil. 654, the SC said that injunction will not lie to restrain the spouse from alienating his or her exclusive property on the ground that the conjugal partnership will be deprived of its fruits. Furthermore, the owner-spouse can freely alienate the property without the consent of the other. (Rodriguez vs. Dela Cruz, 8 Phil. 665).

Whether the administration of such property can be made by either spouse, the SC said yes. In fact, in Peoples Bank and Trust Co. vs. Register of Deeds of Manila, 60 Phil. 167, it was ruled that either spouse may transfer the administration of his or her exclusive property to a third person instead of the other spouse. The transfer of management does not make the transferee the owner thereof. (Rodriguez vs. Dela Cruz, Ibid.).

ELISEO SANTOS, as administrator of Estanislao Santos vs. PABLO BARTOLOME, as administrator of Marcela Tizon

G.R. No. L-18032, November 23, 1922

FACTS:

          Estanislao Santos and Marcela Tizon were united in marriage many years ago and lived together as man and wife in the Province of Pampanga until in the year 1914, when Estanislao Santos died. The widow, Dña. Marcela Tizon, survived until December, 1917, when she also died. No children appear to have been born to the pair, and the persons now interested in their properties are the collateral heirs of the two spouses respectively. After the death of Estanislao Santos the community property pertaining to the two spouses came into the possession and under the control of his administrator, Eliseo Santos, with corresponding duty to collect assets, pay off the debts, and liquidate the estate according to law. In connection with the discharge of these duties, said administrator also came into the possession of certain property pertaining to the widow in her own right, which he managed to the same extent as the community property itself.

ISSUE:

The liquidation of the community estate pertaining to the spouses Estanislao Santos and Marcela Tizon, both of whom are now deceased, and whose respective estates are now represented before the court by Eliseo Santos, as administrator of Estanislao Santos, and Pablo Bartolome, as administrator of Marcela Tizon

HELD:

          Assuming the facts as to this items to be as thus suggested, there can be no doubt that the amount thus paid out to effect the redemption of the property should be deducted from the community assets in liquidation, thereby in effect charging one-half thereof against the portion pertaining to Marcela Tizon. It is undeniable that when the property to which reference is here made was redeemed, it remained, as it had been before, the particular property of Marcela Tizon, for if the right of redemption pertained to her, so also must the property belong to her after redemption. From an observation contained in the appealed decision we infer that the action of the trial judge in rejecting the various claims to which reference has been made was based in part on the idea that said claims should have been submitted to the committed appointed to appraise the property and allow claims against the estate of Marcela Tizon in administration, in conformity with the requirements of section 695, and related provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. From what has been said it results that the judgment appealed from must be reversed, and the clause will be remanded for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion. It is so ordered, without express pronouncement as to costs.